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The relationship between banks and customers has contributed to sev-
eral theories in banking economics. The quality of the credit is crucial
for banks. Banks classify the risk through quantitative and qualitative
indicators. Quantitative indicators are much used by banks, but qual-
itative indicators are also considered in credit risk evaluation. Taken
together, they contribute to increase eﬃciency and decrease doubtful
credit. Several issues arise in order to understand if risk evaluation af-
fects the eﬃciency of the banking sector or if it aﬀects the bank cus-
tomer relationship. We wish to analyse some quantitative and quali-
tative indicators used by the Portuguese banking system. Despite the
reputation of a client being a very important qualitative indicator, it is
not enough to determine a classiﬁcation of low risk.
Key Words: c r e d i t ,b a n k s ,b a n k r u p t c y ,r i s k
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Introduction
The relationship between banks and ﬁrms occupies an important place
in the economic and ﬁnancial literature. On the other side, the relation-
ship between banks and households has not been the subject of so many
studies, and several times it has been covered by the same studies of the
ﬁrms. More recently, and because indebtedness of the households is a
concern by the government authorities, some research in this area has
been developed, studying the reasons for and consequences of debt in
the families. Moreover, there is an important part of the credit for micro
enterprises, confused with the credit to households, either by the kind of
credit or by the guarantees required.
The household customer is deﬁned in this study as families whose
credit is used in their private spending. This is more speciﬁc than in
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much literature about the subject, which covers companies and citi-
zens, and standardize the term ‘private’ to refer to what is non-public.
For the nature of the credit granted, this concept has been sub-divided
into credit to housing, consumer credit and credit for other purposes. In
the credit to ﬁrms, often the subdivision is made by the temporality of
credit, being the long-term concept primarily intended for investment
and the short/medium term for the current operations of the business of
the ﬁrm.
To diﬀerentiate household customers from other customers is impor-
tant in banking activity, because their behaviour diﬀers from the ﬁrms’.
The banks themselves take diﬀerent attitudes to these two kinds of cus-
tomers. Moreover, in industrialised countries, the total amount of credit
granted to individual customers is not less important than that granted
to ﬁrms, particularly for long term loans. Considering the dichotomy
between credit to businesses and credit to individuals, and according to
statistics of credit granted by the Portuguese Association of Banks (As-
sociaçao Portuguesa de Bancos 1994; 2006), credit to ﬁrms in nominal
values tripled between 1993 and 2005, while the credit to households is
eight times more in the same period. While in 1993 the ratio ‘credit to
ﬁrms/credit to households’ was 2.29,i n2005 the ratio stood at 0.97, and
the credit granted to the households has exceeded the credit granted to
ﬁrms after 1999.
One of the problems arising from the growth of credit to individu-
als has been the over-indebtedness of the households. The involvement
of citizens in demand for credit has resulted, on one side, in the deci-
sion of each individual for credit and the consequent oﬀer of banking
products to this segment of the market and, on the other side, by the
general conditions of the economy. Although the Portuguese economy
has shown signs of over-indebtedness, indicators of doubtful credit had
not increased signiﬁcantly in recent years until 2007,w h i c hl e du st oa s -
sume a high degree of eﬃciency in the credit risk evaluation. In 2008,a s
a consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis, doubtful credit increased in both
segments of the market.
This article reviews the criteria for granting credit to ﬁrms and house-
holds and analyses diﬀerences of each one. We evaluate the eﬃciency of
banks in the assessment of credit and determine the importance of qual-
itative and quantitative indicators.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the eco-
nomic principles of the role of the intermediation in the contracts be-
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tween banks and ﬁrms or between banks and households. The third sec-
tion is dedicated to empirical analysis of the indicators of risk of credit.
The fourth section concludes the paper.
Literaturereview
the role of bank intermediation
Several theories of intermediation have developed the relationship be-
tween banks and ﬁrms in an environment of asymmetric information.
Banks impose several incentives in order to solve problems of moral haz-
ard (Allegret and Baudry 1996). According to Stiglitz (1985), the princi-
ples of the theory of intermediation are based on the inability of ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries to obtain the necessary information in a climate of
uncertainty and the inability of banks to control eﬀectively the risk taken
by the borrowers. Gorton and Kahn (1993)s h o wt h ei n t e r e s to ft h eﬁ -
nancial intermediary to take credible procedures, considering a package
of incentives in the contract.
According to Allegret and Baudry, three structures can be observed
in the relationship between banks and ﬁrms: (1) market relationship (2)
hierarchical relationship, and (3) relationship of quasi-integration. The
market relationship (1) is characterized by a greater ﬂexibility in the rela-
tionship and a lack of control by the bank on the quality of information
provided by the ﬁrm. In the market, the loyalty observed in the relation-
ship between banks and ﬁrms does not seem very important. The bank
diversiﬁes its portfolio of clients and the ﬁrm diversiﬁes its sources of
funding. In this case, the ﬁrm can get into greater diﬃculty when start-
ing its activity with investments that have a certain degree of risk. Bad
credit penalties are required by the market itself. It is essential that the
bank establish statistical tests over data provided by the ﬁrms whose re-
sults can justify the restriction of credit. From the opposite side, there is
thehierarchicalstructure(2).Inthiscasethebankhasabilitytocarryout
audits over the ﬁrm. Financing structure is marked bythe dependence of
the ﬁrm on the bank. By diversifying banking products and services of-
fered to the ﬁrms, the bank can monitor more closely the activities of
the ﬁrm. Financial intermediaries occupy the central part of the system.
The ﬁrm, under this structure, maintains a privileged relationship in the
long term with a bank (the principle of authority). On the other side, the
bank obtains the right of interference in the management of the ﬁrm.
Banks, in this case, take control in the management of important sectors
of the ﬁrm: they can monitor and collect information about the ﬁrm,
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as lenders as well as shareholders. The exchange of information between
them is very strong. Finally, the structure of quasi-integration (3)c o r r e -
spondstotheusualcustomerrelationshipswiththebanks.Thisstructure
is a combination of the two other principles, particularly about the need
to create incentives and provide attitudes of conﬁdence. For the ﬁrm, the
importance of this structure is justiﬁed by the durability of the relation-
ship. Consequently, the relationship is not based on a pricing system as
the market structure indicates, or by a kind of administrative authority,
as in the hierarchical structure model. The support of this kind of rela-
tionship is based on the fact that information is expensive and because
of that it should be shared by all the players. The information is the basis
of the relationship and its potential eﬃciency. Firms can have a relation-
ship with several banks, but only one has the role of the main bank. If
the ﬁrm wants to change bank, this attitude will be considered as a sign
of alarm for the bank.
Considering researchonconsumer credit, thelifecyclemodel ofAndo
and Modigliani (1963) should be mentioned. According to this model,
consumers choose a path of optimal consumption for their lives. Thus,
younger consumers borrow more, expecting to re-pay debt with future
revenues. On the other side, middle-aged consumers prefer to save for
their retirement needs. Therefore, the level of consumption is chosen,
based on the expected total income for life without being limited by the
time at which the income is expected to be available. Note that present
resources of a family are the result of income from the past and do not
reﬂect the potential future income of the family. This means that, in a
perfect world, there are no over-indebted consumers. It is assumed that
the permanent income of the consumer depends on their age, current
income (or in cases where there is no data about their income or debt,
the consumption value can be used as a proxy for income or debt), size
of the household and possibly the education level.
the value of confidencein the relationshipbetween
banks, firms and households
According to Gambetta (1988), conﬁdence is deﬁned as a level of sub-
jective probability where an agent evaluates the action to be produced
by another agent, in a context where his own action is also evaluated by
the other. Conﬁdence solves complex problems resulting from the rela-
tionship and reduces, to some extent, the climate of uncertainty where
the relationship is developed. Uncertainty dominates some procedures
in the contracts because the markets are imperfect considering the in-
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formation shared by the players. The contracts are incomplete because
it is not possible to consider all the states of nature underlying the com-
pletion of the contract at the time of the negotiation. The conﬁdence is
born fromthe relationship established bythe agents. But what gives con-
ﬁdence? The geographical proximity of contractors increases the feeling
of belonging to the same community, which may contribute to the res-
olution of the contract. The banks that maintain a close and long-term
relationship with customers are supposed to have a particular attitude to
these customers. For instance, conﬁdence between players supports an
attitude for helping, in temporary diﬃculties the payment of debts. If a
client faces temporary ﬁnancial problems and the bank refuses help to
overcome client diﬃculties, this attitude will destroy the trust and ben-
eﬁt assessment of the long term relationship. According to Allegret and
Baudry (1996), a ﬁrm that does not repay its own debt when it falls in
temporary diﬃcultiescanreceivesomesupportfromthebank.However,
the bank expects that the ﬁrm undertake eﬀorts to resolve their diﬃcul-
ties.
The relationship between banks and customers has registered signiﬁ-
cant changes in recent years. Technological development has facilitated
access to information and contributed to increase the ﬂow of capital be-
tween countries. At the same time, this ﬂow of capital accelerates the
participation of banks in credit. The spread of ﬁnancial markets and the
intervention of foreign investors in domestic markets have contributed
to increase the role of banks in the management of these movements.
In response to the growth of ﬁnancial markets in the world, banks have
developed several services, providing analysis and advice, providing new
bankingproducts,managing investment portfolios,providing creditsfor
investment in stock market, etc. Moreover, one of the most important
consequences is the intensiﬁcation of bank competition, expressed by a
reduction of its ﬁnancial margins. Consequently, the banks have diver-
siﬁed ﬁnancial instruments, as with new saving products and with new
credit products.
the quality of the credit
A problem of the relationship between banks and clients, with ﬁrms
as well households, is the quantity and quality of information required
by the banks to be provided by their customers. Information is shared
among economic agents and that obligation is usually formalized in the
contract. There are asymmetries of information in the relationship be-
tween customers and banks. According to Diamond (1989), it is neces-
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sary to ensure the transmission of information. When a customer re-
quires a loan, he or she communicates information to the bank. How-
ever, the loan is always a repayment to be made in the future, which
makes it diﬃcult to fully ensure the completion of the loan in advance.
The bank may face a situation of moral hazard and the probability of
non-reimbursement increases. However, with the information obtained,
the bank gets an advantage that will allow the bank to examine condi-
tions for future loans. The quality of the information submitted by the
customer is essential. Therefore, the information is usually formalized
by an increase of guarantees provided by the client and the evidence of
audits performed regularly gives more conﬁdence to credit.
The quality of credit is also crucial for banks. Some of the problems
faced by banks are connected with ﬁnancing of high risk projects. Canals
(1997) classiﬁes the diﬃculties registered by the banks into two groups:
cyclical reasons (economic recession, high loans ratio etc) and structural
reasons (low ﬁnancial intermediation, globalisation of markets and ﬁ-
nancial innovation). The analysis of risk and control of the credit are
thus fundamental for banks.
Despite the supervision of banks, loans are always risky. Competition
between banks has led banks to take more aggressive strategies that in-
creases risk in their credit portfolios. On the other side, the existence of
asymmetries of information has led the banks to increase administrative
costs of supervision. Sometimes, clients have the advantage of being able
to hide internal information. Several studies examine the conditions of
an optimal contract. Eber (1996) discusses the conditions of a contract
in a long-term relationship with the ﬁrm. Mojon (1996) considers the
optimal contract, at the time the credit is requested, through the interest
rate negotiated with the bank. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) analyze the opti-
mal contract agreement with the existence of collateral. Diamond (1991)
based his analysis on the ability of the banks to supervise the activity of
the ﬁrm. Pollin and Vaubourg (1996) analyse repeated contracts, which
are signed between the ﬁrm and the bank.
Empirical studies show that there is an optimal ratio for doubtful
credit, which should not exceed 3% of total credit (Sousa 1992). How-
ever, doubtful credit cannot be totally eliminated because a full analysis
ofthecreditistooexpensive. However, shouldinvestment banksaccepta
higher proportion of doubtful credit? Investment banks have fewer pos-
sibilities to diversify their credit portfolio and, consequently, this can in-
crease diversiﬁable risk.
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In the credit market, there are borrowers with a very low risk proﬁle,
a second group with a medium risk proﬁle and a third group with a high
risk proﬁle. Banks know only an estimate of the proportion of customers
ineachgroup.Theﬁrstgroup,probablydoesn’tneedahighlevelofmon-
itoring. The third group, on the other hand, has nothing to lose with an
expostrevelationoftheirsituation.Thus,themonitoringisnowperhaps
more eﬀective in the second group of customers. The existence of doubt-
ful credit in all groups of risk should occur because banks do not know
ex ante the group in which the customer should be classiﬁed. Moreover,
should the banks get beneﬁts in decreased monitoring in order to face a
very competitive market? Is the rapid expansion of credit, which has oc-
curred in the last ten years, the result of decreasing procedures in credit
risk evaluation?
assessmentof creditand risk
Some empirical and theoretical studies about the risk of credit can be
resumed in the use of two kinds of tools. One is more targeted for quan-
titative analysis, as in the study by Rosenwald (1998), and the other for
descriptive analysis, basing the analysis on qualitative indicators, as per
Milewicz (1991). That distinction still persists in more recent studies.
Some authors, such as Mihai (2003), Cossin and Pirotte (2001)d e v e l -
oped their mathematical models following distributions of probabili-
ties and relatively complex mathematical formulae to determine the risk.
They conclude that property values are the best indicators to determine
the risk. Other authors, such as Mallick, Chakraborty, Cresenta (2002),
claim that past behaviour, reputation and the importance of recognized
persons, associated with personal wealth are determinants in the bank-
customer relationship. When a bank decides to limit the credit, risk per-
ceived becomes more important than calculated risk. However, the exist-
ing literature seems more abundant with regard to the study of credit to
ﬁrms than to private customers.
The increase of credit in Portugal has been a study for many au-
thors, such as Japelli and Pagano (2000), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002),
Spiegel (2004), and Brzoza-Brzezina (2004).
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), describe the large increase in credit
in Portugal as a ‘natural’ result of the growing international integration,
with a more free ﬂux of capital from rich countries to poorer ones. The
increase in conﬁdence in the Portuguese economy after the entry of Por-
tugal in to the European Union resulted in more foreign investment in
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Portugal. Increases in the amount of credit were also a result of the dy-
namic of the Portuguese economy and a consequence of decreasing in-
terest rates and inﬂation.
Some recent empirical studies suggest that the marginal propensity
towards consumption (mpc) is in decline in many industrialized coun-
tries. Considering the standard model of representative consumer, there
are two factors apparently not correlated, which, according to Bishop
and Park (2004), are closely linked. The trend of the decline of recent
mpccoincideswiththereductionofrestrictionsoncredit.Atﬁrstglance,
thisshouldnothappen.Curiously,thereisaconsumptiondecreasewhen
debt grows, especially derived by the use of credit cards. The explanation
is thedecrease of income. Thecurrentproliferation of creditcardsmakes
current consumers less responsible than the previous generation about
marginal propensity to save. Nowadays, there is a greater facility to bor-
row, and because of that, consumers are better prepared to face some




The methodology is based on the achievement of two surveys to banks,
one on the assessment of credit to ﬁrms and a second on the assessment
of credit to household customers. These two surveys were made by the
authors at two diﬀerent times. In this paper, we wish to make a joint re-
ﬂection on the problem of risk in the assessment of credit to ﬁrms and
households. The methodology of the survey and collected data is identi-
cal in both researches.
In the survey to the banks, about the methodology to determine
credit’s risk to the enterprises, 27 banks responded out of a total of 52
banks registered in the Portuguese Association of Banks. From the 27
banks that responded, 13 were universal banks, 10 investment banks,
and 4 were foreign banks operating in Portugal. In the second survey,
on the methodology to determine credit risk to household customers,
there were only 20% of the banks that participated in the survey. Note,
however, that investment banks were not included in this second survey.
qualitativeand quantitativeindicators
Banks use quantitative and qualitative indicators to evaluate credit for
ﬁrms as well as for household customers. The ﬁrst ones show the per-
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formance of the ﬁrm or the ﬁnancial strength of the household, and the
second indicators normally reﬂect the quality of management, the repu-
tation of the customer.
The importance of qualitative indicators is founded on the assump-
tion that signs of past or present ﬁnancial soundness may not be suﬃ-
cient to ensure future payments. In this case, the reputation of the cus-
tomer becomes important and reﬂects the conditions of credit in the
contract.
The main quantitative indicators used by banks in the assessment of
creditriskforﬁrmsare:sales;cash-ﬂowgeneratedbytheﬁrm;cash-ﬂows
obtained by the business, ﬁnancial charges, salaries and social charges;
ﬁnancial autonomy; capacity for repayment of loans; debt to the public
sector; debt to other banks; existing mortgages.
The main qualitative indicators are economic and social ones, such
as the location of the business, if the ﬁrm is already classiﬁed as a priv-
ileged client; market reputation for goods or services sold by the ﬁrm;
labour policies; seniority of employees, labour conditions; past commit-
ments and ﬁrm’s strategy; credibility of future commitments; redistri-
bution of proﬁts strategy; innovation; ability to innovate equipment or
procedures, etc.
Forcredittohouseholds,quantitativeindicatorsconsideredinthesur-
vey are: household revenue; historical bank balance sheet of the cus-
tomer; customer wealth in general; patrimony; mortgages; savings ac-
counts and insurance; failure of payment to other banks; taxes default;
past loans; collateral warranties; potential charges with commitments
For qualitative indicators: reputation and credibility of the customer;
opinion of the account manager of the bank; honesty; occupation; em-
ployment conditions; education; age; reputation and ﬁnancial capacity
to face diﬃculties; marital status; number of members of the house-
hold, etc.
We are interested to analyse the banks that give importance to qualita-
tive indicators in order to understand the importance of these indicators
in the credit evaluation. In a ﬁrst attempt to understand the importance
of risk indicators in credit analysis, we have interviewed managers of
threebanks,whichhaveexplainedthemethodologyappliedbythebanks
to evaluate credit risk. The ﬁrst perception was that quantitative indica-
tors have more importance in the credit risk analysis than qualitative
indicators. For the classiﬁcation of banks into universal and investment
banks we have followed the Portuguese Banking Law that transpose sthe
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table 1 Banks classiﬁed by the importance given to quantitative indicators (%)
Group 1 (more than 80% of the evaluation of quantitative indicators) 22
Group 2 (from 60 to 80% of the evaluation of quantitative indicators) 52
Group 3 (more than 40% of the evaluation of qualitative indicators) 26
table 2 Distribution of banks in accordance with the activity and the weight given to
quantitative indicators





Public banks 100 0 2
Private banks 71 29 21
￿ universal banks 63 37 11
￿ investment banks 80 20 10
Foreign banks 75 25 4
￿ universal banks 100 0 1
￿ investment banks 66 34 3
notes Q – percentage of quantitative indicators given to credit risk evaluation.
eecDirective92/30/eecintothePortuguesebankingregulation.Forfor-
eign banks we have considered the banks that have representative oﬃces
in Portugal.
Thus, given that information and data on the assessment of credit to
ﬁrms, the banks were classiﬁed into three main groups:
￿ Group 1: this group gives high importance to the quantitative indi-
cators in the analysis of credit risk. These banks allocate more than
80% of the weight to quantitative indicators and less than 20%t o
qualitative indicators.
￿ Group 2: this group gives more importance to quantitative indica-
tors, but less than the previous ones. The banks included in this
group score between 60% and 80% for quantitative indicators.
￿ Group 3:this groupgives moreimportance to thequalitative indica-
tors in the analysis of credit risk. The banks included in this group
score over 40% of qualitative indicators.
In accordance with the results of the survey, the percentages, given
to the evaluation of credit risk to households were 54% for quantitative
indicators, while for qualitative indicators they were about 46%. Quan-
titative indicators continue to gain a stronger weight in the evaluation of
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credit risk of the households. The most referred are: the total amount of
past credit, average balances of customer accounts, and household rev-
enue. Larger banks favour the quantitative indicators, giving a weighting
of 75%. Smaller Banks have a more equitable balance between quantita-
tive and qualitative indicators.
In accordance with the importance of credit given to individual cus-
tomers, mortgage credit is the most important, followed by credit for
consumption and credit applied to other property such as cars. Also im-
portant is the credit applied to small investments to support participa-
tion in ﬁnancial markets or support participation in small business. Rea-
sons for that kind of credit are: mortgage credit, because of the collateral
and the loyalty of the customer; credit for investment to support busi-
ness, considering the wealth of the customers.
degree of use of quantitativeindicators
in the analysisof creditrisk
Credit to ﬁrms
The quantitative indicator most used by the banks is the indebtedness
level of the ﬁrm and its ﬁnancial autonomy. Meanwhile, quantitative in-
dicators that diﬀerentiate most the importance given by the banks are:
volume sales; total mortgages; expenses on human resources;solvency of
the ﬁrm and cash-ﬂow generated by the business.
The qualitative indicators most used by the banks are: good manage-
ment of the ﬁrm (an indicator often used by 63% of the banks that an-
swered the questionnaire); capacity of the managers (often used by 52%
of the banks); conditions of trade (often used by 13% of the banks) and
the introduction of new technologies in the ﬁrm (used by 37%o ft h e
banks);
The following qualitative indicators mostly diﬀerentiate its use by the
banks: human resources of the ﬁrm (often used by 7% of the banks but
never used by 37% of the banks), the opinion of the manager’s account
about the ﬁrm (used most by 37% of banks and little or never used by
19%).
Table 3 considers the banks that most use quantitative indicators
(>80%) compared with the banks that have a moderate use of these
indicators (<60%) when they analyse ﬁrms with a very low or low risk
level.
Table 4 considers the banks that use most quantitative indicators
(>80%) compared with the banks that have a moderate use of these
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table 3 Banks’ behaviour to very low and low risk level ﬁrms classiﬁed by the use of
quantitative indicators and by the intensity of use of the referred indicators
Bank’s behaviour Risk level
Very low (%) Low (%)
12345 12345
a. No monitoring of the ﬁrm
Q1 –q u a n t i t a t i v e( > 80%)











b. Risk prime (+ or –)
Q1 –q u a n t i t a t i v e( > 80%)











c. Bank’s participation in ﬁnancial needs of the ﬁrm
Q1 –q u a n t i t a t i v e( > 80%)





d. Guarantees (+ or –)
Q1 –q u a n t i t a t i v e( > 80%)







notes Use of the referred indicators: 1 – never used, 2 –s e l d o mu s e d ,3 –u s e d ,4 –
often used, 5 –a l w a y su s e d .
table 4 Banks’ behaviour to high and very high risk level ﬁrms, classiﬁed by the use
of quantitative indicators and by the intensity of use of the referred indicators
Bank’s behaviour Risk level
High (%) Very high (%)
12345 12345
c. Reduce the participation of the bank in credit and other operations
Q1 –q u a n t i t a t i v e( > 80%)








Q1 –q u a n t i t a t i v e( > 80%)








Q1 –q u a n t i t a t i v e( > 80%)







f. Interfere in the management of the ﬁrm
Q1 –q u a n t i t a t i v e( > 80%)











indicators (<60%) when they analyse ﬁrms with a very high or high risk
level.
Table 5 considers the banks that use the most quantitative indicators
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table 5 Banks’ behaviour to doubtful credit ﬁrms, classiﬁed by the use of
quantitative indicators and by the intensity of use of the referred indicators

































































































(Q > 80%) compared with the banks that have a moderate use of these
indicators (Q < 60%) when they analyse doubtful credit.
The most referenced indicator is: ‘increase the guarantees’ for high
risk ﬁrms (see table 4,r o wd). If the class of risk increases, the answers
go from ‘often used’ to ‘always used.’ Only for ﬁrms classiﬁed with very
low risk is the reduction of the guarantees used more, namely for banks
that use preferably quantitative indicators.
Considering now the reduction of interest rate prime (see table 3,
row b), there are diﬀerences in the attitude of banks towards very low
risk ﬁrms from those classiﬁed with other levels of risk This percentage
dropped from 66% (often used or always used) considering very low risk
ﬁrms, to 33% for low risk ﬁrms, considering banks that give high per-
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centage to quantitative indicators (>80%). For banks that give moderate
percentage to quantitative indicators (>60%) this percentage is not so
signiﬁcant (from 57%t o50 % considering often used plus always used
indicators).
The restriction of credit for higher risk ﬁrms (see table 4,r o we)i s
considered bymostbanks:100%and71%(inaccordance with morethan
80% weight given to quantitative indicators or less than 60%) indicated
‘alwaysused’forveryhighriskﬁrms,decreasingto67%and14%fo rhigh
risk ﬁrms.
Financing very low risk ﬁrms (see table 3,r o wc)i sc h o s e nb ya l lt h e
banks.Somediﬀerencesarefromveryusedtousedindicators,whencon-
sidering very low risk ﬁrms to low risk ﬁrms. There is, however, strong
caution of banks in ﬁnancing businesses. Banks wish to reduce credit to
ﬁrms with very high risk and even for ﬁrms with high risk. However,
there are diﬀerences of attitude by banks that use more quantitative in-
dicators than those that use less than 60%.
We also observed the relationship between the risk and the need to
s u p e r v i s et h eﬁ r m( s e et a b l e3,r o wa). Reducing the supervision is not
clear,evenforﬁrmsclassiﬁedasverylowrisk:nearlyhalfoftheresponses
indicate that the banks do not attenuate the supervision of ﬁrms classi-
ﬁed as very low risk.
Finally, the willingness of banks to interfere in the management of
ﬁrms, in case of danger of bankruptcy (see table 5,r o we)i sn o tf o l l o w e d
by most of the banks that give more than 80% weight to quantitative
indicators, but is considered for some banks that give less than 60%o f
weight to quantitative indicators. All the banks prefer to renegotiate debt
in case of bankruptcy risk than to interfere in the management of the
ﬁrm.
Finally, we analyse the association between risk level and reputation,
if reputation is really important in the rating risk of the ﬁrm.
We also observed that obtaining a good reputation is a sign of the
bank’s readiness to consider the ﬁrm as low or very low risk (see be-
low table 6,r o wb). As soon as the risk level increases, less important is
reputation in the evaluation. The banks that value less the quantitative
indicators (<60%) are those that associate more the reputation of the
ﬁrm with very low risk.
One main beneﬁt of this sign is the proposal of new products, a higher
protection if the ﬁrm faces diﬃculties or a more favourable interest rate
for 44% of the banks (see table 7). In conclusion, having a good repu-
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table 6 Banks’ behaviour to the reputation of the ﬁrm, classiﬁed by the use of
quantitative indicators and by the intensity of use of the referred indicators
Bank’s behaviour face
to reputation of the
ﬁrm (%)
Banks Bank’s behaviour face
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table 7 Attitude of the banks to the reputation of the ﬁrms by the intensity of use of
the referred indicators
Attitude (1)( 2)
Increase relationship with the ﬁrm 81
Protection in case of temporary diﬃculties 52
Favourable interest rate 44 11
Less guaranties 30 11
Less administrative requirements 81
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) often used + always used (%), (2)n e v e r
used + seldom used (%).
tation is important for negotiating credit but not enough to reduce the
level of bank guarantees in the contract.
Credit to Household Customers
Intheevaluation ofcreditrisktohouseholds,themostusedindicatorsto
evaluate credit risk are the credit ﬁle of the customer and his present and
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table 8 Use of quantitative credit risk indicators by the banks to evaluate household
customers, by the intensity of use of the referred indicators (%)
Quantitative credit risk indicators (1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)
1. Customer account (average balance) 25 75
2. Permanent salary and other revenues 33 67
3.P a t r i m o n y * 22 56 22
4. Mortgages 12 44 44
5. Saving accounts and insurances 11 11 33 33 11
6. Failure payments with other banks 100
7.T a xd e b t s 11 11 22 56
8. Amount of the loan 11 89
9. Purposes of the loan 56 44
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) never used, (2)s e l d o mu s e d ,( 3)u s e d ,( 4)
often used, (5) always used. *Houses, ﬁrms, shares, and other kind of wealth.
expected revenue. Failure of past obligations of repayment are heavily
penalized. The loan is confronted with other indicators related with the
customer’s wealth and reputation.
The most important quantitative factors in the assessment of credit
risk are, in order of importance: Failure with other banks; customer ac-
count; stable income; debts to tax authorities:
The most important qualitative indicators in the assessment of credit
riskare,inorderofimportance:permanentemployment;reputationand
credibility of the client:
Profession and age are equally important though less than the previ-
ousindicators. Therelationshipoftheaccountmanager withtheclient is
more or less considered in the evaluation. Marital status and the number
of elements of the household are also relatively indicated by some banks.
Consumption level and a more favourable economic conjuncture are
the main factors referred by the banks to justify the increase of credit to
households.
On other side, favourable interest rates and household revenue are the
most mentioned indicators for high demand of credit.
Banksfavourcredittohouseholdsdespitetheincreaseofintrinsicrisk.
Banks have the opinion that the beneﬁts are higher than the risk of credit
to households.
For banks, despite some credit risk to households, they have favoured
consumption credit and other credit products destined to households.
Managing Global TransitionsRisk and Eﬃciency in Credit Concession 323
table 9 Use of qualitative credit risk indicators by the banks to evaluate household
customers, by the intensity of use of the referred indicators (%)
Quantitative credit risk indicators (1)( 2)( 3)( 4)( 5)
1. Reputation and credibility of the client 22 33 45
2. Relationship of the account manager* 11 22 22 45
3. Moral integrity and honesty of the borrower 12 44 44
4. Profession of the client 33 45 22
5. Permanent employment 55 45
6. Academic studies of the client 12 22 55 11
7.A g e 44 44 12
8. Reputation and wealth of other members** 13 12 50 25
9. Marital status 11 44 22 22
10. Number of members of the household 11 11 33 22 22
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) never used, (2)s e l d o mu s e d ,( 3)u s e d ,( 4)
often used, (5) always used. *With the client. **Of the household.
table 10 Factors that contribute to the credit to households, by the intensity of
importance of the referred indicators (%)
Factors (1)( 2)( 3)( 4)
1. Financial liquidity of the banks 50 13 37
2. Competition in banking industry 11 11 44 33
3. Consumption level 11 33 56
4. Favourable economic conjuncture 66 34
5.E c o n o m i cg r o w t h 89 11
6. Government incentives for credit 12 50 38
notes Column headings are as follows: (1)n o ti m p o r t a n t ,( 2) little important, (3)
important, (4)v e r yi m p o r t a n t .
Forcredittoﬁrms aswelltocredittohouseholds,banksgive moreim-
portance to quantitative indicators. However, as a consequence of bank-
ing competition, banks have oﬀered new credit products to households
and give more weight to some qualitative indicators. They recognize that
because of this strategy, intrinsic risk has increased but bank eﬃciency
has not been reduced because of increased risk.
Conclusion
This study explains the indicators considered by banks to analyse the
credit risk. Controlling those indicators, they contribute to better eﬃ-
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table 11 Factors that contribute to household demand for credit, by the intensity of
importance of the referred indicators 8%)
Factors (1)( 2)( 3)( 4)
1.I n c r e a s e dw a g e s 89 11
2. Lower interest rates 100
3. Better conditions of credit to younger households 11 33 33 22
4.O ﬀer of credit products 11 78 11
5. Good economical conditions 33 56 11
6. Government incentives to credit 22 45 33
7.C o n s u m e rb e h a v i o u r 13 75 13
notes Column headings are as follows: (1)n o ti m p o r t a n t ,( 2) little important, (3)
important, (4)v e r yi m p o r t a n t .
table 12 Banks’ attitude for the demand of credit by household customers
Statement Answer (%)
1. More credit products have increased household customers,
including those that have no possibilities in accordance with
previous credit conditions
t6 7 , f33
2. Increased demand for credit has led banks to reduce conditions
of credit evaluation.
t22, f78
3. Increased credits to households have contributed to increasing
banking risk
t55, f45
4. Despite an increase in intrinsic risk, bank eﬃciency is not reduced t89, f11
notes t –t r u e ,f –f a l s e .
ciency in the Portuguese banking system. The credit market has regis-
tered a strong expansion in the Portuguese economy, where the assess-
ment of credit to households has obtained, in recent years, ﬁgures never
seen before. Banks use quantitative indicators as well qualitative indi-
cators in the analysis of the credit risk. Banks give more importance to
quantitative indicators in the credit evaluation, mainly in credit to ﬁrms.
In the evaluation of credit to households, qualitative indicators have rel-
atively more weighting in the analysis of assessment of credit. However,
even in this segment larger banks prefer quantitative indicators, while
smaller ones give more importance to qualitative indicators. The impor-
tance of quantitative and qualitative indicators is related with the exis-
tence of asymmetries of information. However, asymmetries of infor-
mation are impossible to totally remove and some qualitative indicators
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gainimportanceincreditriskevaluation, suchasthegoodreputationfor
the ﬁrm as well for the household. Reputation is not a diﬀerent value for
ﬁrms and for households. Despite the fact that for ﬁrms, banks consider
the kind of business important, for both it is important to signal respect
for past compromises. Ethical integrity is important for the managers as
well for the head of the household. Moreover, some quantitative indica-
torsareindependent fromthosequalitativeones.Forexample,thefailure
of payment of debt with other banks, which is considered a quantitative
indicator, also reveals the behaviour and/or reputation of the client.
The intensiﬁcation of banking competition has led the banks to lower
the interest rate and provide more banking products. This situation
makes us presuppose that doubtful credit was increasing. However, con-
sidering the values of doubtful credit ratios, these have relatively low
values (more or less three percent of total credit). Banking seems to be
competitive and eﬃcient in creating more products and controlling the
risk. However, the economy has expanded until 2007.I nam o r es t a g -
nated economy probably the excess of credit to households would reveal
its consequences and credit evaluation should restrain credit. On the
other hand, most of the information provided by the banks does not
reveal the a real situation of its strategies and its consequences.
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